St. John's Law Review
Volume 44, Spring 1970, Special Edition

Article 11

A Concept of the Conglomerate Firm
John M. Kuhlman
Richard M. Duke

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

A CONCEPT OF THE CONGLOMERATE FIRM
JOHN

M.

RICHARD

KUHLMAN*

M.

DUKE**

An apparent lack of relationship among the product lines of conglomerate firms creates a conceptual problem for those who wish to analyze their
behavior. Generally, the growth of the conglomerate firm over a period of
time produces a record of seemingly unrelated acquisitions and examination
of the order in which they were made often fails to provide any sense of a
corporate objective or rationale in terms of product lines.
It is the purpose of this paper to present a concept of the conglomerate
firm that explains the apparent illogical nature of its product diversity and
its acquisition record. This concept focuses upon the objectives of the conglomerate firm, and not upon the price-cost relationships of its specific
products. The intent of this paper is to develop this concept; the formulation
of hypotheses and the results of testing them with data are not included
here.
The central theme of this paper is that in the development phase the
conglomerate firm is financially oriented, rather than product oriented, and
that its primary objective is rapid growth of earnings. If successful, the
conglomerate later enters into a mature stage in which its top management
devotes less attention to acquisitions and more to existing product lines.
The following discussion places more emphasis upon the development
phase because it is in this phase that the behavior of conglomerates makes
them appear different from other firms and creates the problem of an apparent lack of rational economic behavior.
THE DEVELOPMENT PHASE

Several behavioral aspects of the creation and development of conglomerates follow from the propositions that conglomerate management is financially oriented and that its primary objective is very rapid growth of earnings. As long as the primary objective is very rapid growth of earnings,
conglomerate management must make acquisitions, for they do not allow
themselves the time to build new capital facilities, produce new products,
and then establish a place for them through promotional campaigns. Furthermore, in order to realize their primary objective, conglomerate management must make acquisitions at a rate that increases its earnings rapidly
enough for the firm to become acknowledged as a "growth" company. This
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means that the developing conglomerate will make many more acquisitions
in a few years than a more traditional firm.
In order to achieve its desired rate of acquisitions, the conglomerate
earndoes not limit itself to acquisitions that can be financed by retained
operings; instead, the growth of a conglomerate is a financial pyramiding
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As a result of the emphasis upon the utilization of the firm's asset base
for financial leverage, the management of the conglomerate values potential
acquisitions in terms of financial criteria rather than operational criteria.
The value of an acquisition is in its capacity to contribute to the conglomerate's financial base rather than in its product lines and their relation to
the products of the acquiring firm. The conglomerate management is primarily interested in the effect of the present acquisition on its ability to
make future acquisitions.
Several consequences follow from this emphasis:
(1) Conglomerates tend to make acquisitions on a more opportunistic
basis than do production-oriented firms or firms engaged in an orderly program of diversification. Consequently, conglomerate management will be
less concerned with such subjects as distribution systems and the need to
reconcile those systems. It will have little or no reason to relate the products
of the acquired and acquiring firms.
3
Conglomerates, instead, generally seek firms that are profitable or
undervalued, or possessing a low price-earnings ratio, large cash reserves, or
unutilized tax credits of one type or another. What is sought, in effect, is a
firm with a financial position which will permit the conglomerate to enlarge its financial base in greater proportion than the increase in the asset
base. It is this increase in the financial base which pernits further acquisitions. Thus the criteria for profitable acquisitions is to be found in the
effect of the merger on the financial base of the conglomerate. This criteria
is in contrast to the mergers of the production-oriented firm, which measures
the profitability of a merger in terms of its effect on the long-term operational profit of the firm.
is slightly different than that in E.
(1958). His optimal financial unit is
related to the cost of production and is defined in terms of average cost and output. In
the present instance, the financial base is related to the growth of the firm.
2 Over a succession of time periods, the conglomerate may be borrowing in both the
long- and short-term financial markets, selling equity securities, buying property and
leasing it to others, selling property and leasing it back, and so on. Some of the strategies,
such as the sale of property and lease-back contracts, may be costly in the long run, but
in the short run they provide an immediate expansion in the firm's financial base.
1 The concept of the financial base used here
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(2) The management of the conglomerate firm is financially oriented.
In many instances the personnel of the acquired firms continue to provide
the operational management. This is particularly true of the conglomerate
firm in the initial phases of its acquisition program. In such an instance, the
would-be conglomerate may have little in the way of operational management skills. Thus its first acquisitions will, of necessity, have to be managed
by the management personnel associated with the acquired firm, while the
top management of the conglomerate devotes most of its attention to considering possible acquisitions and to negotiations.
(3) In order to maximize its short-term growth, the conglomerate makes
the maximum use of its financial capacity. In other words, it operates toward
the margin of its financial base. Unused financial capacity is regarded as a
wasted resource. In contrast to the traditional firm, capacity in the case of the
conglomerate is a financial concept. The crucial financial issue is, given an
existing stock of assets and a projected flow of income, how large a financial
structure can be supported? Further, given the assets and projected income,
what structure of financial instruments will yield the optimal financial base?
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPLEX CAPITAL STRucTuRE

The emphasis on rapid rate of growth through acquisitions requires
that the company sustain a financial performance that will be favorably assessed by the financial community. The failure to do so jeopardizes the
continued success of the merger program, and ultimately, management continuity.
Since the earnings-per-share of common stock is frequently used as
a measure of company performance, conglomerates characteristically issue
securities that cannot reduce this figure. These issues include debt instruments and equity securities other than common stock. Extensive use of
debt as a means of financing acquisitions is indicative of the conglomerate's
greater willingness to assume risk. But further, the use of debt lessens the
threat to the management by dissident stockholders.
The percentage debt of the total capital structure of the conglomerate
also indicates what might be thought of as the maturity of the conglomerate
firm. First, a firm obviously cannot continue to increase its debt as a percentage of its total capital structure without limit. But more significantly, it
appears that at some stage in the development of a conglomerate this ratio
will decline.
THE MATURE CONGLOMERATE

Conglomerate firms cannot continue to develop indefinitely through
acquisitions. At sone point several factors begin to take effect, each of which
serves to limit the external growth of the conglomerate. The first of these
factors is the size of the successful conglomerate, i.e., as it grows, larger acquisitions are required to maintain the same relative growth rate in earnings.
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A second factor is the diminished supply of companies suitable for conglomerate acquisition. This is a result of the acquisitions made by several
conglomerates over a period of years; after a time, few desirable firms remain
independent. A third factor is the higher prices which the stockholders and
managers of such firms will demand. Finally, the fact remains that at some
point capital allocation decisions must be made concerning existing product
lines. A time must come when the conglomerate management must decide
between using available financial resources for acquisitions or for the
4
modernization, replacement or expansion of capital facilites. Thus, as these
factors make it more difficult to maintain an increasing rate of short-term
growth, the attention of conglomerate management will shift from the
growth objective to operational objectives.
Adversity is one force that has caused some conglomerates to enter into
the mature phase earlier than the factors just described. Conglomerates that
have encountered a decline in earnings have often sold assets in order to
recover as quickly as possible. They have done this because their emphasis
upon a rapid short-term growth rate during the development phase precluded the initiation of cost-reduction programs to improve earnings. Furthermore, since conglomerate management operates near the margin of the
firm's financial base, it may be impossible to borrow funds to carry the firm
through a crisis. Thus, the reaction to adversity by some conglomerates has
been not only to become less diversified, but also to change their primary
objective toward more concern with the firm's existing product lines.
CONCLUSIONS

What we have described is a concept of a life cycle for the conglomerate
firm. It differs fron that of the more traditional firm in several respects.
The most important difference is in the use of acquisitions to achieve rapid
short-term growth in the developing phase. This accounts for the apparent
haphazard nature of the product lines acquired by conglomerates. The
rationale for the conglomerate is not revealed by its products but, instead,
by its use of its financial base as it pursues its objective of rapid short-term
growth of earnings. Conglomerates become highly leveraged in the process,
and consequently, their capital structures often become complex. During
the development phase a characteristic reaction of conglomerates to a decline in earnings is to sell assets. This is consistent with the primary objective
of rapid short-term growth of earnings and with their manner of realizing
this objective: an emphasis upon the financial value of assets rather than
upon their productive uses.
4 Reid, Conglomerate Growth: Consistency with Economic Theory of Growth, in
ECONOMICS OF CONGLOMERATE GROWTH (L. Garoian ed. 1969). A similar observation was
made by Harold S. Geneen, President of International Telephone and Telegraph, before
the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House of Representatives. Wall Street Journal, Nov.
21, 1969, at 8, col. 2.
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After a time, conglomerates that survive the development phase enter
into a mature phase. For some conglomerates adversity hastened entry into
this phase, causing them to become less diversified and, more importantly,
less concerned with making future acquisitions and more concerned with
managing their existing product lines. And even if a conglomerate escapes
adversity, at some point in time its management must pay more attention
to operating affairs and less to new acquisitions.
It is noteworthy that this concept does not cite attempts to innovate or
to achieve economies as factors important to the development of conglomerate firms. Although these factors are not ruled out for conglomerates in
the mature phase, the development of conglomerates is viewed essentially as
a process of utilizing the financial positions of existing firms in order to develop a larger firm through leverage. This concept allows one to regard
the development of conglomerates as, in part, a process of taking advantage
of imperfections in the market for firms and in financial markets. This
thought raises the question of whether conglomerates are more than a temporary phenomenon, for the imperfections in these markets may be overcome or reduced. And it raises the question of whether conglomerates contribute real benefits to the economy.

